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I n movies and novels, tax havens are often settings for shady international deals; in practice, they are rather less fl ashy. Tax havens are countries and territories that offer low tax rates and favorable regulatory policies to foreign investors. 
For example, tax havens typically tax inbound investment at zero or very low rates 
and further encourage investment with telecommunications and transportation 
facilities, other business infrastructure, favorable legal environments, and limited 
bureaucratic hurdles to starting new fi rms. Tax havens are small: most are islands; 
all but a few have populations below one million; and they have above-average 
incomes. Tax havens are also known as “offshore fi nancial centers” or “international 
fi nancial centers,” phrases that may carry slightly differing connotations but never-
theless are used almost interchangeably with “tax havens.”
The defi nition of exactly what makes a tax haven may depend on the type 
of investment and requires a degree of judgment, but fortunately, those who have 
considered the issue keep compiling very similar lists. For example, in Hines and 
Rice (1994), my coauthor and I identifi ed tax havens based on their low business 
tax rates, self-promotion as fi nancial centers, and whether they were identifi ed as 
tax havens by other authoritative sources. OECD (2000) identifi ed a similar list of 
tax havens (though one that omits OECD countries), as did Diamond and Diamond 
(2002) and the U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce (2008). Table 1 offers a 
rather inclusive list of 52 countries and territories commonly considered to be tax 
havens. Taken together, they have a total population of about 50 million and a total 
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GDP of about $1.1 trillion—that is, roughly the size of the economy of New York 
State. However, three-quarters of that GDP lies in four countries—Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Singapore, and Switzerland—and 16 of these economies have national 
GDPs of less than $2 billion.
The United States and other higher-tax countries frequently express concerns 
over how tax havens may affect their economies. For example, tax havens might erode 
domestic tax collections by permitting individuals to earn income through accounts 
in tax havens that they do not disclose to their home governments, or else by facili-
tating a situation in which business income actually earned in high-tax jurisdictions is 
reported for tax purposes as having been earned elsewhere. Tax havens could attract 
economic activity that is arguably lost to higher-tax countries where the activity might 
otherwise have located. Some worry that corporate and banking secrecy offered 
by tax havens could facilitate criminal activities, including crimes by dictators, and 
terrorist and drug-related activities. Confi dential accounts in tax havens might reduce 
the transparency of fi nancial accounts and thereby impede the smooth operation 
and regulation of legal and fi nancial systems around the world. Finally, differences 
between the policies of tax havens and those of other countries may contribute to the 
problem, if it is one, of excessive international tax competition.
These concerns are all plausible, albeit often founded on anecdotal rather than 
systematic evidence. They are buttressed by a sense, held by many, that there is 
something distasteful in the kinds of fi nancial transactions for which tax havens are 
best known.
Yet tax haven policies may also benefi t other economies and even facilitate the 




Anguilla Hong Kong Netherlands Antilles
Antigua and Barbuda Ireland Niue
Aruba Isle of Man Panama
Bahamas Jersey Samoa
Bahrain Jordan San Marino
Barbados Lebanon Seychelles
Belize Liberia Singapore
Bermuda Liechtenstein St. Kitts and Nevis
British Virgin Islands Luxembourg St. Lucia
Cayman Islands Macao St. Martin
Cook Islands Maldives St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Costa Rica Malta Switzerland
Cyprus Marshall Islands Tonga




Note: See text for the selection method.
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nature of tax competition among other countries, very possibly permitting them to 
sustain high domestic tax rates that are effectively mitigated for mobile international 
investors whose transactions are routed through tax havens. By differentiating tax 
burdens in this way, countries are able to maintain sizable domestic tax bases in the 
face of growing international competition. The fi nancial and other business activity 
taking place in tax havens is likely to contribute to economic activity elsewhere, 
since tax havens themselves are largely intermediaries, with rather small economic 
sectors relative to their fi nancial footprints. The presence of a nearby thriving tax 
haven fi nancial sector seems to increase the competitiveness of a country’s banking 
sector. In fact, countries that lie close to tax havens have exhibited more rapid real 
income growth than have those further away, possibly in part as a result of fi nancial 
fl ows and their market effects.
While historically tax havens were associated with corporate anonymity and 
bank secrecy, initiatives by the OECD and other international coalitions have 
prompted every country, including now all of the tax havens, to agree to infor-
mation exchange for tax enforcement purposes. Furthermore, some intriguing 
recent evidence (reported by Sharman in this issue) suggests that large wealthy 
countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom may have become 
locations of choice for those interested in establishing anonymous accounts. Tax 
havens are far from being rogue dictatorships that sponsor international terrorism 
and related activities; instead, tax havens typically score very highly in measures of 
democratic governance.
This paper evaluates evidence of the economic effects of tax havens, starting 
with the international investment fl ows associated with tax havens and the concerns 
they raise. This is followed by analyzing the impact of tax havens on capital markets 
and foreign direct investment, and the likely effect of tax havens on tax policies 
elsewhere. The conclusion considers economic growth patterns associated with tax 
havens and their implications for developing countries in particular.
Tax Havens and International Investment
By every measure, tax havens receive large capital fl ows from other countries. 
Standard practice divides private international capital fl ows into direct and port-
folio investment. Direct investment is the accumulation of ownership claims in a 
foreign entity in which the investor has a controlling interest, almost always defi ned 
as 10 percent or greater ownership shares. Hence, if an American multinational 
fi rm invests $10 million of equity capital in its wholly-owned French subsidiary or 
loans $10 million to the same subsidiary, this is recorded as $10 million of U.S. 
direct investment in France. Portfolio capital fl ows refl ect investments in which the 
investor does not have a controlling interest as defi ned by the 10 percent criterion; 
thus, if an American individual spends $1,000 to purchase stock in a publicly-held 
German corporation, this represents $1,000 of portfolio investment from the 
United States to Germany.
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Tax havens receive large gross fl ows of portfolio investment from other coun-
tries. Table 2 reports data from the IMF (described in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 
2010, and available at ⟨http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm⟩) on 
total stocks of inbound portfolio investment at year-end 2002 and 2007 in the eight 
non-haven countries with more than $1 trillion of inbound investment in 2007 and 
all tax havens with at least $5 billion of inbound investment. The table also presents 
Table 2
International Portfolio Investment, 2002 and 2007
Portfolio investment GDP
2002 2007 2006 Population
Country In millions of dollars 2006
United States 3,284,387 7,347,223 12,738,526 298,442,420
United Kingdom 1,368,065 3,649,266 1,887,495 60,609,153
Germany 1,359,512 3,213,623 2,513,585 82,422,299
France 846,926 2,411,138 1,850,544 63,292,515
Netherlands 824,709 1,687,390 550,650 16,491,461
Italy 737,610 1,543,029 1,651,612 58,133,509
Japan 509,922 1,467,298 3,892,954 127,515,169
Spain 335,783 1,355,310 1,223,615 40,397,842
Luxembourg 648,876 2,133,046 35,280 474,413
Cayman Islands 534,553 1,827,291 2,415 46,663
Ireland 240,389 1,234,862 164,008 4,062,235
Switzerland 230,987 665,090 274,697 7,523,934
Bermuda 138,916 515,387 3,130 66,436
Hong Kong 68,929 341,900 281,730 6,940,432
Jersey 47,364 320,968 5,100 91,812
Netherlands Antilles 70,026 223,143 3,141 223,016
Singapore 42,265 170,916 184,854 4,492,150
British Virgin Islands 24,499 86,915 1,107 24,150
Guernsey 16,628 78,933 2,742 65,632
Panama 13,731 40,136 27,355 3,206,481
Cyprus 1,877 28,166 18,882 784,301
Bahamas 13,851 27,424 8,306 303,770
Marshall Islands 484 14,151 436 60,451
Bahrain 32 10,146 18,377 698,585
Liberia 2,805 8,546 1,127 3,043,979
Isle of Man 194 6,764 2,942 75,715
Mauritius 640 6,401 23,809 1,253,425
32 other tax havens 7,926 20,283 171,246 17,792,778
Sources: For portfolio investment, the IMF (see ⟨http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm⟩); for 
GDP and population, the Penn World Tables, version 6.3 (⟨http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/⟩), supplemented, 
as needed, by information from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 2009).
Notes: The table presents year-end 2002 and 2007 portfolio investment levels in (for the top panel) 
countries with at least $1 trillion of portfolio investment, and (for the bottom panel) tax havens with 
at least $5 billion of portfolio investment in 2007. Information for “32 other tax havens” includes every 
other country listed in Table 1, except St. Martin, for which data are unavailable.
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fi gures for population and GDP in 2006, drawn from the Penn World Tables 
(Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009) and supplemented for very small countries 
with data from the CIA (2009). Among the eight large countries in the top panel 
of the table, inbound portfolio investment levels at year-end 2007 are of the same 
order of magnitude as their GDPs, but that is not true of many of the tax havens in 
the bottom panel, whose portfolio investment is well out of proportion to income or 
population. For example, Luxembourg has greater inbound portfolio investment 
than Japan, which has more than 250 times the population of Luxembourg; more 
dramatically, the Cayman Islands has the sixth-largest portfolio capital infl ow in 
the world, despite having the population and income of a medium-sized American 
city. Volumes of portfolio investment in these and other tax havens have grown 
substantially, more than tripling between 2002 and 2007. Of course, these fi gures 
represent gross rather than net capital infl ows, and almost all of this inbound capital 
was subsequently invested elsewhere; but by any measure, tax havens process large 
volumes of capital transactions.
As locations for purely pass-through fi nancial entities, tax havens are hard to 
beat. Financial fl ows through tax havens are typically not subject to local taxes, 
which means that certain kinds of tax obligations—such as stamp taxes, capital gains 
taxes, and withholding taxes—can be avoided or deferred. Tax havens are loath to 
impose currency restrictions or capital controls on international fl ows. Financial 
companies in tax havens are often easier and less expensive to establish than are 
intermediaries elsewhere, with lower fi ling and annual registration fees, and fewer 
regulatory constraints on fi nancing and corporate organization. Furthermore, 
there is often considerable local legal, accounting, and fi nancial expertise available 
to assist investors.
For most tax havens, nearby countries are the largest sources and destinations 
of their capital fl ows. Table 3 presents regressions in which the dependent variables 
are U.S. dollar volumes of portfolio capital fl ows between tax havens and non-havens. 
The dependent variable in the regression reported in column one is the magnitude 
of capital fl ows in millions of U.S. dollars at year-end 2006 into tax havens in other 
countries. The “Distance” from a tax haven to another country is constructed as the 
distance between the geographic centers of each country (reported by CIA, 2009) 
minus an adjustment for country size.1 In the fi rst column, the insignifi cant – 0.1115 
coeffi cient refl ects that tax haven GDP has little discernable effect on the magnitude 
of inbound capital fl ows, whereas the 5.0326 coeffi cient indicates that (not surpris-
ingly) the size of the economy in the source country has a large effect: a $1 billion 
higher income in a country adjacent to a tax haven is associated with $5 million 
greater gross investment in that haven. The – 0.3509 coeffi cient in the fi rst column 
indicates that nearby countries receive the most investment: 1,000 kilometers of 
greater “Distance” reduces the effect of GDP by roughly 7 percent (0.3509/5.0326), 
1 The adjustment for country size in calculating “Distance” treats each country as though perfectly round 
in calculating an approximate distance from the country center to the border; specifi cally, the adjust-
ment equals the square root of the ratio of country land area (reported by CIA, 2009) and π.
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thereby effectively reducing investment by that fraction. A similar pattern appears 
in column 2, in which the dependent variable is the portfolio capital fl ow from tax 
havens to non-haven countries. Tax haven GDP again has an insignifi cant effect 
on capital fl ows, whereas the 7.7363 coeffi cient in column two indicates that adja-
cent countries receive an additional $7.7 million in portfolio capital fl ows from 
tax haven neighbors for every $1 billion of their (non-haven) GDP. The estimated 
– 0.5617 coeffi cient implies again that proximity strongly infl uences capital fl ows; 
indeed it has a stronger effect on investments from tax havens to non-havens than 
for capital fl ows from non-havens to havens. The third column reports estimated 
coeffi cients from a regression in which the dependent variable is the total volume of 
gross inbound and outbound capital fl ows between tax havens and non-havens, the 
–1.1668 coeffi cient indicating that 1,000 kilometers of “Distance” is associated with 
$1.2 million reduced total inbound and outbound investment for every $1 billion 
of non-haven GDP.
Given the ability of portfolio capital to fl ow to anywhere in the world, it is 
striking that proximity has such a substantial effect. Part of the explanation surely 
lies in the extent to which private sector professionals, and indeed the tax havens 
themselves, cater their practices, procedures, and regulations to clients from nearby 
Table 3
Tax Haven Investment and Proximity
Dependent variable: Investment (millions of dollars)



























Number of observations 1,575 1,948 688
R 2 0.0837 0.1537 0.1792
Notes: The table reports coeffi cients from regressions in which the dependent variable is portfolio 
investment in millions of U.S. dollars at year-end 2006. The dependent variable in the regression reported 
in column 1 is investment in tax havens; the dependent variable in the regression reported in column 2 
is investment from tax havens to non-haven countries; and the dependent variable in the regression 
reported in column 3 is the sum of investment between non-haven and tax haven pairs. GDP is measured 
as billions of 2006 U.S. dollars. “Distance” to a tax haven equals distances between geographic centers of 
each country, minus an adjustment for country sizes that treats each country as though perfectly round, 
and equals the square root of the ratio of country land area and π. The variable “Distance * Non-Haven 
GDP” is the interaction of “Distance,” in thousands of kilometers, and GDP of the non-haven country, in 
billions of dollars. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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jurisdictions, developing appropriate expertise and marketing their services through 
the development of business connections. But also, the underlying IMF data are 
potentially incomplete, so it is possible that the data to a certain degree refl ect that 
nearby transactions are more apt to be reported than are other transactions.
Tax havens are also major recipients of direct investment from high-income 
countries. Direct investment is undertaken almost entirely by multinational corpo-
rations, and the most ample foreign direct investment data are reported for U.S. 
investment by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). Table 4 presents direct investment data for 2004 as reported in BEA (2008); 
2004 is the most recent year for which the most comprehensive BEA data are 
available. The table presents aggregate information for U.S. multinational fi rms 
investing in each of 27 tax havens in which U.S. assets exceeded $50 million in 2004, 
with the category “United Kingdom Islands, Caribbean” encompassing the Cayman 
Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, and Montserrat, and 
the category “haven total” consisting of the 46 tax havens for which there are BEA 
data. The tax havens as a group had 0.84 percent of the non-U.S. world popula-
tion in 2004 and 2.30 percent of non-U.S. world GDP, refl ecting their high average 
incomes and the contribution of foreign investors to their economies.
The foreign activities of American fi rms are more concentrated in tax havens 
than their economic sizes would ordinarily warrant: tax haven operations had 
6.06 percent of the foreign employee compensation (and 5.55 percent of foreign 
employment) of U.S. fi rms in 2004. Tax havens similarly had 6.49 percent of the 
foreign property, plant, and equipment of American fi rms in 2004. These patterns 
refl ect the attractiveness of putting income-earning activities in such low-tax juris-
dictions and the somewhat greater capital intensity of operations that should be 
expected in an environment in which profi ts, which are largely returns to capital, 
are lightly taxed. The BEA data do not include information on the location of intan-
gible assets, such as intellectual property, but if they did, they would surely show that 
ownership of such assets is also strongly concentrated in tax havens. Among the tax 
havens, employment together with property, plant, and equipment is concentrated 
in the larger jurisdictions of Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore, and Switzerland.
The fi nancial operations of American fi rms in tax havens are also refl ected in 
the numbers in Table 4. American multinational fi rms locate 27 percent of their 
foreign gross assets in tax havens, despite the relatively small sizes of these econo-
mies, and report that 42 percent of their foreign incomes are earned in tax havens. 
The income fi gure can be easily misinterpreted to suggest that American fi rms 
misreport their foreign earnings, as it seems incongruous that operations with 
only 6 percent of foreign employment or property, plant, and equipment could 
account for 42 percent of foreign income. However, most of the income reported 
in tax havens arises because multinational fi rms commonly use tax haven affi liates 
as conduits for investment in other foreign affi liates; for example, an investment 
from the United States to France might be routed through Luxembourg to avoid 
certain French taxes. When the French affi liate remits some of its foreign profi ts 
in the form of interest and dividend payments, the income is fi rst received by the 
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Luxembourg affi liate, which then pays it to the American parent company in the 
form of a dividend. Hence, a sizable fraction of the income reported in tax havens 
is in fact income earned by other foreign affi liates that American parents invest in 
Table 4
U.S. Direct Investment in Tax Havens, 2004







Country In millions of dollars
Aruba 2,139 2,344 714 (D) (D) 430 88
Bahamas 7,512 16,701 719 4,069 495 359 72
Bahrain 15,725 246 17 773 20 71 36
Barbados 6,307 19,659 235 3,944 2,221 1,856 30
Belize 2,525 151 20 147 5 44 5
Bermuda 2,909 455,281 4,712 47,878 28,492 5,700 218
Costa Rica 40,685 7,565 831 3,478 406 987 403
Cyprus 17,500 1,065 42 702 55 219 23
Hong Kong 245,455 165,598 5,412 63,534 6,854 7,977 3,760
Ireland 145,882 345,052 13,751 134,379 39,266 35,957 4,569
Jordan 26,649 206 61 148 9 35 21
Lebanon 29,462 465 17 204 13 31 15
Liberia 993 2,644 613 2,520 260 419 115
Liechtenstein 2,474 1,153 2 341 2 46 12
Luxembourg 31,640 519,147 1,213 12,409 42,540 952 575
Malta 7,422 1,310 53 129 94 44 20
Marshall Islands 423 2,485 1,232 835 437 526 66
Mauritius 21,618 3,190 31 402 –272 50 9
Netherland Antilles 2,883 60,167 28 549 12,340 –8 10
Panama 23,441 6,890 1,213 3,410 495 585 238
Singapore 159,251 138,284 9,996 133,944 15,076 14,229 3,709
St. Lucia 1,773 77 18 56 14 21 4
Switzerland 258,934 317,023 6,825 135,897 26,041 17,096 5,681
United Kingdom 
 Islands, Caribbean
3,170 284,563 2,051 20,004 13,973 1,814 423
Haven total 1,056,772 2,351,266 49,806 569,752 188,836 89,440 20,102
All countries 
 (U.S. not included)
45,983,540 8,688,553 766,865 3,312,531 450,760 818,256 331,593
Haven percent 2.30% 27.06% 6.49% 17.20% 41.89% 10.93% 6.06%
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (2008).
Notes: The table presents data reported by BEA (2008) on U.S. direct investment in the 27 tax haven 
countries in 2004 with assets of at least $50 million (“U.K. Islands, Caribbean” includes the Cayman 
Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, and Montserrat); “Haven total” includes all 
46 countries for which BEA data are available. Table entries are aggregates for all U.S. investment in each 
country. Total assets are total gross assets; Net PPE is the book value of property, plant, and equipment. 
Entries that are deleted to preserve survey respondent confi dentiality are denoted (D).
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indirectly through tax haven operations. This is refl ected in the sizable difference 
between the tax haven share of the foreign net income (42 percent) and value 
added (11 percent) of American multinational fi rms. Value added equals sales 
minus purchases from other fi rms, thereby excluding fi nancial income, and the 
much smaller contribution of tax haven affi liates to total value added refl ects that 
tax haven affi liates are used as intermediaries. The effect of fi nancial ownership is 
also evident in the fi gures for affi liates located in the fi nancial centers of Barbados, 
Bermuda, Luxembourg, the Netherlands Antilles, and the Caribbean U.K. Islands, 
which together report fi nancial and nonfi nancial income of $99.6 billion, or 
22 percent of the total income of American foreign affi liates in 2004, along with 
employment expenses of just $1.256 billion, representing 0.38 percent of the total 
foreign employee compensation of American affi liates that year.
Several patterns are evident from the data in Table 4. Tax havens attract signifi -
cantly greater U.S. direct investment and employment than their small economic 
sizes would ordinarily merit, though they nonetheless account for a modest share of 
the total foreign operations of U.S. companies. American operations in tax havens 
are reported to be extremely profi table, though on closer examination most of this 
unusual profi tability is illusory, refl ecting fi nancial income from assets held in other 
countries through tax haven affi liates. It is clear that signifi cant amounts of capital 
fl ow through business operations in tax havens.
Concerns and Reactions
Capital fl ows to tax havens raise two types of concerns: fi rst, that reported fl ows 
are so large; and second, that the reported fl ows are not large enough, in that some 
investment goes unreported. The fi rst concern is that capital fl owing through tax 
havens thereby avoids regulation or taxation by other countries. Indeed, the use of 
tax haven locations by portfolio investors or multinational fi rms is in many cases 
motivated in part by the ability to structure transactions in a way that is not subject 
to local taxation. This reduction in taxes can be achieved in several ways.
In the case of multinational fi rms, a common use of tax haven intermediaries 
is to permit foreign direct investment to be fi nanced with greater amounts of debt 
rather than equity, in order to benefi t from the tax deductibility of interest payments. 
Thus, for example, an American fi rm investing in its wholly-owned affi liate in a 
high-tax foreign location (such as Japan) might fi rst invest the funds in a tax haven 
affi liate, which then invests only a small portion of the funds in equity in the Japanese 
affi liate and loans the rest to the Japanese affi liate. The benefi t of this arrangement 
is that the Japanese affi liate thereby pays interest from Japan to the tax haven; the 
interest payments are deductible against taxable income in Japan and are taxable 
(in principle) in the tax haven, though since the tax haven may have a tax rate of 
zero this is relatively unimportant. Properly structured, this arrangement need not 
trigger U.S. taxes at the time of interest payments, though the United States taxes 
the foreign incomes of American corporations when returned to the United States, 
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so some U.S. taxes will be due on this income when ultimately remitted from the tax 
haven affi liate to the U.S. parent company.
In this example, the ability to structure transactions reduces Japanese tax 
obligations and increases the attractiveness of investing in high-tax Japan. From 
the standpoint of Japan, this is problematic to the extent that fi rms fi nance their 
investments with excessive debt; though Japan along with most other countries 
(including the United States) imposes taxes on cross-border interest fl ows and also 
limits the ability of foreign investors to deduct interest payments to related parties. 
Consequently, Japan has the ability to reduce the benefi ts of investments structured 
through tax havens if it is concerned about the use of tax haven intermediaries. 
From the standpoint of the United States, it is generally benefi cial for American 
taxpayers to avoid foreign taxes, since doing so improves their after-tax rates of 
return and facilitates U.S. tax collections. The United States taxes the repatriated 
foreign incomes of American companies but grants credits for foreign taxes paid, 
thereby effectively taxing U.S. fi rms on the difference between the U.S. and foreign 
tax rates. Lower foreign tax rates entail smaller credits for foreign taxes and greater 
ultimate U.S. tax collections (Hines and Rice, 1994). Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) 
offer evidence that U.S. fi rms with foreign affi liates in certain tax havens pay lower 
foreign taxes and higher U.S. taxes than do otherwise-similar large U.S. compa-
nies. A countervailing consideration is that the use of tax haven structures to avoid 
foreign taxes might make foreign investment too attractive to American fi rms, and 
thereby reduce investment in the United States.
A more aggressive form of tax avoidance is available to business taxpayers 
who adjust the prices used for intercompany transactions in order to exploit tax 
rate differences between countries. An excessively transparent method of doing 
so would be to sell a paper clip from an affi liate in a tax haven to an affi liate in a 
high-tax location, charging a price of $1 million. This creates a tax deduction of 
$1 million in the high-tax buying country, and taxable income of $1 million in the 
tax haven, thereby reducing total taxes. To prevent such behavior, governments 
have adopted arm’s length pricing rules requiring that the prices used for inter-
company transactions must be the same as those that would have been chosen by 
unrelated parties transacting at arm’s length. Clearly, the arm’s length pricing 
standard addresses $1 million paper clips, but there is widespread concern that 
the diffi culty of applying the arm’s length standard to many ordinary cases—to say 
nothing of complex transactions involving sophisticated fi nancial instruments or 
intangible property such as patents and trademarks—leaves ample opportunity 
for tax avoidance.
There is extensive evidence that reported after-tax profi t rates of multinational 
fi rms are higher in low-tax-rate countries (for example, Desai, Foley, and Hines, 
2003; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Clausing, 2009). This evidence is consistent with 
the data in Table 4 indicating that American fi rms report that 10.93 percent of 
their foreign value added is earned in their tax haven operations that account for 
roughly 6 percent of their foreign employment and property, plant, and equipment. 
This pattern is consistent with incentives to adjust transfer prices in a tax-sensitive 
James R. Hines Jr.     113
manner, though this evidence must be interpreted cautiously, since it is also consis-
tent with adept but fully legal business and tax planning.
Because tax havens have very low tax rates, they create some of the strongest 
incentives for transfer price adjustment designed to reallocate taxable income away 
from high-tax jurisdictions. Indeed, some advocacy groups criticize tax havens for 
allegedly preventing the developing world from effectively taxing foreign invest-
ment in their countries. Christian Aid (2009), for example, argues that the transfer 
pricing opportunities provided by tax havens cost developing countries $160 billion 
a year in lost tax revenue, thereby being responsible for the deaths of 1,000 children 
a day. While such estimates are not consistent with other statistical evidence, they 
nevertheless refl ect a widespread public concern about tax havens, and in particular 
their effect on vulnerable developing countries.
Portfolio investment in tax havens raises somewhat different concerns. 
Investments routed through tax havens generally avoid certain comparatively 
minor taxes on gross transactions, such as stamp duties and withholding taxes 
on cross-border fl ows, but on the whole, taxpayers are generally unable to defer 
home-country tax liabilities on foreign portfolio investment. As a result, there is 
little, if any, incentive for investors living in high-tax countries to earn portfolio 
income in low-tax foreign jurisdictions, as such income is immediately taxed by 
their home governments.
With regard to portfolio investment, the primary concerns are that it can be 
diffi cult for governments to monitor and regulate foreign portfolio investments, 
and that individuals can hide money in anonymous accounts set up in tax havens. 
Tax havens are the locations of choice for anonymous accounts, so the thinking 
goes, both because they collect little or no tax on investment returns and because 
many have traditions of protecting investor privacy. Recent revelations of signifi cant 
numbers of European individuals with unreported Liechtenstein bank accounts 
and American individuals with unreported Swiss bank accounts contribute to these 
concerns. Some advocacy groups like Oxfam (2000) argue that the ability to hide 
funds in anonymous tax haven accounts contributes particularly to the problems 
of developing countries, whose corrupt leaders, they argue, make extensive use of 
such accounts.
The international reaction to tax havens has focused on the OECD, which in 
1998 introduced what was then known as its Harmful Tax Competition initiative 
(OECD, 1998), and is now known as its Harmful Tax Practices initiative. The purpose 
of the initiative was to discourage both OECD member countries and certain tax 
havens outside the OECD from pursuing policies that were thought to harm other 
countries by unfairly eroding tax bases. In particular, the OECD criticized the use 
of preferential tax regimes that included very low tax rates, the absence of effec-
tive information exchange with other countries, and “ring-fencing” (meaning that 
foreign investors were entitled to tax benefi ts that domestic residents were denied). 
The OECD identifi ed 47 such preferential regimes, in different industries and lines 
of business, among OECD countries, most of which have been subsequently abol-
ished or changed to meet OECD objections.
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As part of its Harmful Tax Practices initiative, the OECD also produced a List of 
Un-Cooperative Tax Havens, identifying countries that have not committed to suffi -
cient exchange of information with tax authorities in other countries. The concern 
was that the absence of information exchange might impede the ability of OECD 
members (and other countries) to tax their resident individuals and corporations 
on income or assets hidden in foreign tax havens. As a result of the OECD initiative, 
along with diplomatic and other actions of the G-7, G-20, and individual nations, 
all 38 countries and jurisdictions identifi ed by the OECD, along with others, have 
committed to improve the transparency of their tax systems and to facilitate infor-
mation exchange with tax treaties and tax information exchange agreements. While 
it remains to be seen just how effective some of these changes are in practice, the 
secrecy that was once a feature of certain offshore accounts will clearly be much 
more diffi cult to obtain in the future.
Tax Havens and Financial Market Competition
Financial industries in tax havens compete with fi nancial operations elsewhere. 
The fi nancial sectors of economies in much of the world are tightly controlled by 
small numbers of fi rms and by governments, either through regulated monopolies 
or, most commonly, through state ownership of banks (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer, 2002), quite apart from the government takeovers that followed the 
crash of 2008. This pattern particularly characterizes low-income countries and 
those lacking strong democratic institutions, where government ownership of the 
banking sector is the norm and where there is pervasive cronyism in the allocation 
of credit. The resulting absence of competition in credit markets can be expected 
to raise interest rates charged to consumers and businesses, and encourage credit 
rationing in which certain borrowers are effectively unable to obtain credit at any 
feasible price. Furthermore, absence of competition in banking is likely to infl u-
ence the entire fi nancial sector. As La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) 
document, countries with monopolized banking sectors, and accompanying 
underdeveloped fi nancial sectors, exhibit slow rates of productivity growth and low 
per capita incomes.
Financial fi rms located in nearby tax havens have the potential to address some 
of the problems associated with uncompetitive fi nancial sectors by providing compe-
tition. Rose and Spiegel (2007) document that commercial banks in countries close 
to tax havens have lower interest rate spreads (that is, lower differences between 
the borrowing rates banks charge and the rates that depositors are paid) than do 
other countries, which is a reliable indicator of greater banking competition. Their 
estimates indicate that, controlling for other observable factors, doubling a coun-
try’s distance from the nearest tax haven is associated with interest rate spreads 
that are 1.63 percentage points larger (for example, an interest rate spread of 
5.63 percent rather than a spread of 4.00 percent). Other variables offer similar 
evidence of the effect of tax haven proximity on fi nancial market competition. The 
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banking sectors of countries located closer to tax havens are less concentrated than 
the banking sectors of other countries, in that the share of the market controlled 
by the fi ve largest banks is smaller and the total number of banks divided by GDP is 
greater. Doubling a country’s distance from the nearest tax haven is associated with 
a 6.91 percent greater share of the country’s banking sector controlled by the fi ve 
largest commercial banks. This along with the larger total number of commercial 
banks in countries close to tax havens may refl ect the diffi culty of monopolizing a 
domestic banking sector when investors have alternatives nearby.
The market competition associated with proximity to tax havens has observable 
effects on the fi nancial sectors of affected countries. Rose and Spiegel (2007) report 
that, compared to other countries, the private fi nancial markets of economies with 
nearby tax havens extend more credit to their private sectors; have greater aggre-
gate market borrowing; and have higher levels of M2, a monetary aggregate that is 
partly the product of intermediation by the banking sector. All of these measures 
are consistent with high levels of private-sector fi nancial activity.
Evidence of an association between fi nancial market competition and proximity 
to a tax haven is open to multiple possible interpretations; after all, a jurisdiction 
may be more likely to become a tax haven if located near other countries with well-
developed fi nancial markets. Alternatively, factors such as political or legal systems 
common to certain regions of the world might also be associated with fi nancial 
market development. But while it is diffi cult to know with certainty how tax havens 
affect nearby fi nancial markets, the apparent competitive effects are consistent 
with what one might expect from entry into a monopolized or quasi-monopolized 
sector that otherwise charges above-market prices to consumers and businesses, that 
rations capital on the basis of personal relationships, and that thereby serves as a 
drag on local economies.
Tax Havens and Business Activity in High-Tax Countries
There is widespread concern that low-tax jurisdictions impose costs on other 
countries in attracting investment, employment, and other business activity that 
would otherwise locate in nearby high-tax areas. However, no reliable estimates 
exist of the magnitude of such a diversion.
Indeed, the process may actually work the other way: that is, tax havens may 
reduce the costs of entering high-tax jurisdictions in a way that promotes invest-
ment and economic activity (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006a, b). An example is that 
the use of tax haven affi liates to facilitate debt fi nancing of investments in high-tax 
Japan may encourage investment that otherwise would not locate in Japan. In addi-
tion, investors located in the United States and the few other countries that tax 
active foreign business income can use tax havens to facilitate deferral of home-
country taxation of foreign income, which increases returns to foreign investments. 
Finally, fi nancial services and other intermediate goods and services obtained at 
low after-tax cost in tax havens increase the productivity and competitiveness of 
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economic operations in high-tax countries, thereby increasing demand for produc-
tion in those locations.
In Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006b), my coauthors and I consider the effect of 
tax havens on investment in high-tax countries by examining the complementary 
effect of investment in high-tax countries on demand for tax haven operations. 
For this purpose, we use foreign economic growth rates as instruments for foreign 
investment by American fi rms. Thus, for example, if Italy’s economy grows at 
3 percent per year and Spain’s economy grows at 1 percent per year, American fi rms 
will tend to expand their operations more rapidly in Italy than in Spain. In this 
example, some American fi rms start with signifi cant Italian operations and others 
with signifi cant Spanish operations. As long as a fi rm’s initial distribution of foreign 
investment in 1982 can be treated as random, then the subsequent differential 
growth rates of their economies can be used to predict non-tax-haven investment. 
These predicted growth rates are then matched to the likelihood of the same fi rms 
creating or eliminating tax haven affi liates between 1982 and 1999. The results 
indicate that greater sales or investment activity outside of tax havens is associated 
with greater demand for tax haven affi liates. For the typical American multinational 
fi rm, a 1 percent greater likelihood of establishing a tax haven affi liate is associated 
with 0.5 to 0.7 percent greater sales and investment growth outside of tax havens. 
The theory of the fi rm implies that complementarity is symmetric, so if foreign 
investment makes the use of tax havens more attractive, it follows that the use of tax 
havens makes foreign investment more attractive (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006a).
A study by Blanco and Rogers (2009) draws similar conclusions from its analysis 
of the effects of foreign direct investment in tax havens on foreign direct investment 
in low-income countries in the same regions. Using country-level data on aggregate 
foreign investment fl ows from 1990–2006, this study reports that investment in 
developing countries is positively associated with proximity to the nearest tax haven 
and to the level of foreign investment in the nearest tax haven. This evidence is a 
reminder that the ability of investors to use tax haven operations need not divert 
activity from nearby high-tax jurisdictions, instead suggesting that fi rms facing 
reduced costs of establishing tax haven operations respond in part by expanding 
their foreign activities in nearby high-tax countries.
There is a closely related question about the effect of foreign direct investment 
on economic activity in home countries. If tax havens encourage foreign direct 
investment in even high-tax foreign countries, might that not divert economic 
resources that would otherwise be devoted to producing jobs and activity at home? 
Put differently, how should the government of a capital-exporting country view insti-
tutions that contribute to international capital investment?
It is far from clear that greater levels of outbound foreign direct investment 
come at the cost of economic activity at home, since there are countervailing substi-
tution and productivity effects. Substitution refl ects that output can be produced 
either at home or abroad, so for a fi xed total output, any additional foreign produc-
tion then necessarily reduces domestic production, and foreign investment comes 
at the cost of domestic investment. The productivity effect refl ects that increases 
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in foreign investment have the potential to raise the return to domestic produc-
tion, stimulating demand for domestic activity and domestic output. Firms might, 
for example, fi nd that foreign operations provide valuable intermediate inputs at 
low cost or that foreign affi liates serve as ready buyers of tangible and intangible 
property produced at home. In either of these cases, the ability to exploit foreign 
opportunities increases total demand for domestic factors of production.
Several recent studies suggest that greater outbound foreign direct investment 
may not reduce the size of the domestic capital stock, and more likely increases it. 
This conclusion emerges from time-series evidence of the behavior of U.S. multi-
national fi rms (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2005); aggregate evidence for Australia 
(Faeth, 2006); industry-level studies of Germany (Arndt, Buch, and Schnitzer, 
2007) and Canada (Hejazi and Pauly, 2003); and fi rm-level evidence for the United 
States (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2009), the United Kingdom (Simpson, 2008), and 
Germany (Kleinert and Toubal, 2007). The diffi culty confronting all of these studies 
is that foreign investment refl ects economic conditions that very likely also directly 
infl uence domestic investment, making it diffi cult to identify the pure effect of 
greater foreign investment on domestic economic activity.
Detailed fi rm-level evidence indicates signifi cant causal effects of foreign invest-
ment on domestic activity. In Desai, Foley, and Hines (2009), my coauthors and I 
evaluate the extent to which increased foreign activity by U.S. manufacturing fi rms 
infl uenced their domestic activities between 1982 and 2004. We construct fi rm-specifi c 
foreign GDP growth measures, which can be used to generate predicted growth rates 
of foreign activity that are then used to explain changes in domestic activity. This 
empirical procedure effectively compares two U.S. fi rms, one whose foreign invest-
ments in 1982 were, for example, concentrated in Britain, and another whose foreign 
investments were concentrated in France. As the British economy subsequently grew 
more rapidly than the French economy, the fi rm with British operations should 
exhibit more rapid growth of foreign investment than would the fi rm with French 
operations. If the domestic activities of the U.S. fi rm with British operations grow at 
different rates than the domestic activities of a similar U.S. fi rm with French opera-
tions, it may then be appropriate to interpret the difference as refl ecting that foreign 
business expansions stimulate greater business activity at home.
Foreign economic growth rates are strong predictors of subsequent foreign 
investment by U.S. fi rms, which can then be compared to changes in domestic activity. 
The estimates reported in Desai, Foley, and Hines (2009) imply that 10 percent 
greater foreign capital investment triggers 2.6 percent additional domestic capital 
investment, and that 10 percent greater foreign employee compensation is associ-
ated with 3.7 percent greater domestic employee compensation. There are similar 
positive relationships between foreign and domestic changes in assets, and numbers 
of employees. Furthermore, 10 percent greater predicted foreign sales growth is 
associated with 6.5 percent greater exports to foreign affi liates and 5 percent higher 
domestic R&D expenditures. These estimated relationships suggest that fi rms 
combine home production with foreign production to generate fi nal output at 
lower cost than would be possible with production in just one country, making each 
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stage of the production process more profi table and therefore more abundant. 
Hence the simple substitution story, in which fi rms have fi xed investment stocks 
that can go either to one place or to another, is inconsistent with this evidence. As 
a result, it may well be that tax havens facilitate foreign investment—and thereby 
indirectly also stimulate economic activity in capital exporting countries.
Tax Haven Governance
The central characteristics of countries that become tax havens are by now 
well understood: tax havens are small, typically below one million in population, 
and are generally more affl uent than other countries. In addition, new evidence 
(Dharmapala and Hines, 2009) shows that tax havens score very well on the World 
Bank’s cross-country measures of governance quality that include measures of voice 
and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, and 
control of corruption. These World Bank governance quality measures are reported 
by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005), who compile 352 different underlying 
governance-related variables reported in 37 different data sets collected by interna-
tional organizations, private fi rms, nonprofi ts, and universities.
This evidence indicates that there are almost no poorly governed tax havens. 
In part, this refl ects that tax havens have above-average incomes, which tend not 
to be associated with poor governance. Furthermore, small countries may display 
different political patterns than other countries. But even after controlling for 
these factors, tax havens score highly on World Bank governance measures. In 
Dharmapala and Hines (2009), in regressions controlling for other observable 
variables including income, population, and aspects of geography, my coauthor 
and I fi nd a large effect of good governance on the likelihood of becoming a 
tax haven: improving the quality of governance from the level of Brazil’s to the 
level of Portugal’s raises the likelihood of a small country being a tax haven from 
26 percent to 61 percent.
Why are better-governed countries more likely than others to be tax havens? 
One interpretation is that the returns to becoming a tax haven are greater for 
well-governed countries: that higher foreign investment fl ows, and the economic 
benefi ts that accompany them, are more likely to materialize for well-governed tax 
havens than they would for poorly-governed countries that attempt to set them-
selves up as fi nancial centers. In this interpretation, poorly governed countries 
do not forego potential economic benefi ts in not becoming tax havens, since few 
benefi ts would fl ow to them if they did. Evidence from the behavior of American 
fi rms is consistent with this explanation in that among poorly governed coun-
tries low tax rates do not prompt very much additional U.S. investment, whereas 
among well-governed countries there is a signifi cant investment effect of lower tax 
rates (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009).
This interpretation of the evidence is not the only one possible; for example, 
perhaps the fi nancial activity of tax haven economies, and resulting affl uence, 
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improves local governance by encouraging media outlets, keeping citizens informed, 
and rewarding high-quality public service with the returns that can be earned in a 
market economy upon leaving government. Either way, having high-quality gover-
nance institutions and effective public servants is closely connected to effective 
operation as a tax haven.
The evidence that tax havens tend to be well-governed may seem inconsistent 
with the reputation of tax havens as locations in which investors can readily hide 
assets in order to launder funds, evade taxes, or avoid other fi nancial commitments. 
As Sharman points out in this issue, anonymous corporations and bank accounts 
located in tax havens or elsewhere can be used for all sorts of purposes, including 
money laundering and tax evasion. Sharman approached corporate service providers 
in 22 different countries about the possibility of creating shell corporations, for 
which, in those cases in which anonymous companies were successfully established, 
he also attempted to create anonymous bank accounts. He was unable to establish 
anonymous corporations using corporate service providers located in commonly 
identifi ed tax havens including the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman 
Islands, Dominica, Nauru, Panama, and the Seychelles. By contrast, corporate service 
providers in countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, and 
Canada proved more helpful to his enterprise. He readily established anonymous 
corporations using these providers, with those in the United States distinguished by 
the ease with which they accommodated his request to create the corporations and set 
up bank accounts with unverifi able personal information.
The adherence of tax haven corporate service providers to established norms 
of documentation and transparency in the creation of corporations and bank 
accounts may have many sources, including the efforts of the OECD (recounted 
in Sharman, 2006) and various national governments. This, together with national 
aspirations and ability to wield effective government power with transparent demo-
cratic governance, may conspire to make tax havens more effective at enforcement 
and thereby much less attractive locations for money laundering and tax evasion 
than some of their larger brethren. Financial transparency has many attractive 
features—for example, it indirectly reduces opportunities for domestic and foreign 
corruption by making it diffi cult to hide the proceeds of bribery. Consequently, 
it may not be surprising that good governance and fi nancial scrupulousness are 
associated among tax havens.
Tax Policies and Tax Competition
Countries eager to attract foreign investment might compete with each other 
by reducing tax rates, as a result of which taxes, and therefore government expen-
ditures, could be driven to ineffi ciently low levels. To the extent that tax havens 
contribute to this tax competition, either by offering investors low tax rates or by 
making investment more mobile, they might be responsible for some of the prob-
lems associated with excessive tax competition (Slemrod and Wilson, 2009). The 
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likelihood of such an outcome depends on the tax policies available to governments 
and the nature of the competitive environment.
It is noteworthy that international tax competition may also produce outcomes 
in which capital taxes are higher than they would be in the absence of competition. 
This can happen when there is foreign ownership of productive factors or when 
multiple governments attempt to tax the same income sources (Hines, 2006).
The case of foreign ownership is perhaps easiest to understand: governments 
that care only about the welfare of domestic residents have incentives to adopt 
policies that enrich residents at the expense of foreigners. Foreign ownership of 
local fi rms may encourage governments to raise local capital tax rates above the 
levels they would impose in the absence of economic openness because much of the 
tax burden is borne by foreign owners. Even foreign ownership of local land may 
trigger higher corporate tax rates if the burden of corporate taxes is in part borne 
by landowners in the form of lower property prices. If all governments respond to 
these incentives, then capital will be overtaxed by everyone.
The integration of world economies can contribute to the incentive that coun-
tries face to tax business income too heavily. Integrated business production may 
entail many stages in several different countries, all of which contribute to fi nal 
output. In such a setting, taxes on one stage of production impose burdens on all 
the others by reducing the after-tax returns earned from producing fi nal output. 
Taxpayers can avoid these taxes, but at a cost; and one method of avoidance is to 
scale back on production everywhere. As noted by Keen (1998) and others, the 
vertical nature of production in several countries gives incentives to impose taxes 
for which signifi cant parts of the burdens are borne by other taxing jurisdictions—
which leads to overtaxation.
Tax havens fi gure prominently in current debates over the scope and conse-
quences of tax competition. Tax havens are widely believed to accelerate the process 
of tax competition between governments. However, a more likely possibility is that 
the tax avoidance opportunities presented by tax havens allow other countries to 
maintain high capital tax rates without suffering dramatic reductions in foreign 
direct investment. Hence, the widespread use of tax havens may retard what would 
otherwise be aggressive competition between other countries to reduce taxes in 
order to attract and maintain investment. In effect, what tax havens do is to permit 
governments to distinguish investments, subjecting relatively immobile domestic 
investment to higher tax rates than the highly mobile international investment. 
Keen (2001) and Hong and Smart (2007) identify the wide set of conditions in 
which countries benefi t from differentiating tax systems in this way and the effect of 
such differentiation in improving the outcomes of tax competition.
Whatever incentives there may be to compete over tax rates, the tax burden on 
corporate income in OECD countries has fallen little, if at all, over the past 25 years 
(Griffi th and Klemm, 2004; Hines, 2006). Corporate tax rates have fallen, but these 
declines have been at least matched by expansions in corporate tax bases. The use 
of tax havens by foreign investors helps to explain this evidence, as high-tax coun-
tries are able to maintain high-tax rates on domestic investment while continuing 
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to draw signifi cant levels of foreign investment (Hines, 2006). The persistence of 
corporate tax collections does not imply an absence of tax competition, but instead 
that, in the modern fi nancial world, competition takes a form that does not entail 
reduced corporate taxation.
Tax Havens and Economic Growth
The policies of tax havens can affect their own economic fortunes and those 
of other countries, possibly infl uencing measured national economic growth 
rates—particularly during the recent period of expanded international trade and 
investment, when transactions facilitated by tax havens had the greatest volume 
and presumed impact. Table 5 presents information on per capita real annual 
economic growth rates for various groups of countries between 1992 and 2006. 
Group averages are constructed by weighting individual country growth rates by 
square roots of 1992 GDP—though other weighting methods, or using population 
rather than GDP weights, produce similar patterns, as does starting the growth 
rate calculations in 1982.
Table 5 shows that tax havens exhibit faster economic growth rates than do 
other countries. Tax havens averaged 2.85 percent annual per capita real economic 
Table 5
Tax Havens and Economic Growth, 1992–2006




Non-OECD except China 2.17%
Tax havens 2.85%
Non-havens 2.39%
Countries close to tax havens (excluding tax havens) 2.56%
Countries far from tax havens (excluding tax havens) 2.14%
Source: The table presents average annual per capita real GDP growth rates 
between 1992 and 2006, based on country data from the Penn World Tables, 
version 6.3 (⟨http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/⟩), and supplemented, as needed, 
by information from the CIA (2009).
Notes: Group averages are constructed from country data using square roots of 
1992 GDP as weights. Countries close to tax havens are non-haven countries 
located no more than 825 kilometers from a tax haven, with the measurement 
of distance including an adjustment for country sizes. In particular, “Distance” 
equals distances between geographic centers of each country minus an 
adjustment for country sizes that treats each country as though perfectly 
round and that equals the square root of the ratio of country land area and π.
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growth from 1992 to 2006, compared to 2.39 percent for the world as a whole. 
OECD countries (including the tax havens in the OECD) averaged 2.26 percent 
annual per capita real growth over this period, and non-OECD countries other than 
China (which is so large that it drives overall results) averaged 2.17 percent annual 
per capita real growth.
The bottom panel of Table 5 distinguishes (non-haven) countries by distance 
to the nearest tax haven. Ranked in order of “Distance,” the median country in the 
world is 825 kilometers from the nearest tax haven, so those located closer than 
825 kilometers are designated “close,” others “far.” The data indicate that countries 
located closer to tax havens exhibited somewhat more rapid economic growth over 
these periods than did others further away: countries located close to tax havens 
had 2.56 percent average annual per capita real economic growth rates between 
1992 and 2006, compared to 2.14 percent for the rest of the world. This difference 
hints at the possibility that tax havens contribute to economic growth elsewhere, 
though the omission of so many relevant variables and the nonrandom location 
of tax havens mean that the correlation of economic growth and proximity to tax 
havens must be interpreted with caution. Furthermore, the correlation of economic 
growth and proximity to tax havens may mean that, conditional on there being tax 
havens in the world, a country benefi ts from having one nearby—but that is not 
quite the same as saying that the country is made better off by the existence of tax 
havens. Still, this evidence is suggestive, and given the policy interest in the effect of 
tax havens on developing countries, it is worth examining whether this correlation 
persists when looking at a sample of developing countries and controlling for base-
year economic conditions.
Table 6 presents estimated coeffi cients from regressions that explain 
national economic growth as a function of base-year population, per capita GDP, 
and distance from tax havens and the rest of the world. The sample includes 
observations for 76 countries that the United Nations Human Development 
Index ⟨http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/⟩ classifi ed as having “medium” or 
“low” human development, and for which data are available. The – 0.0155853 
coeffi cient in the regression reported in column 1 indicates that, controlling for 
base-year population and GDP, countries located closer to tax havens experienced 
more rapid economic growth: 1,000 kilometers of additional “Distance” to the 
nearest tax haven is associated with 0.016 percent slower annual per capita growth 
between 1992 and 2006. Including squares of base-year log population and log 
GDP as controls reduces the estimated magnitude of coeffi cient on tax haven 
“Distance” to – 0.011707, reducing the estimated effect of 1,000 kilometers of 
“Distance” to 0.012 percent slower economic growth. Some countries are located 
far from tax havens because they are distant from other countries in general, 
and such distance might itself affect economic growth rates, though including a 
variable that measures a country’s (GDP-weighted) distance from all other coun-
tries has little effect on the estimated effect of distance to the nearest tax haven; 
likewise, considering growth effects over a longer (1982–2006) time range makes 
no important difference to these results.
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Conclusion
Tax havens are successful players in the world economy. They draw large 
amounts of foreign investment; their per capita incomes and rates of economic 
growth exceed world averages; and they have well-functioning democratic 
governments. Despite low tax rates, the public sectors of tax havens appear to be 
well-funded, accounting for roughly 25 percent of GDP, a fraction that exceeds the 
world average, albeit lying somewhat below those of the most affl uent countries 
(Hines, 2005).
Does tax haven affl uence come at the expense of the rest of the world? The low 
tax rates available in tax havens can encourage tax avoidance by multinational fi rms 
that structure their transactions to reduce taxable incomes in the highest tax juris-
dictions, and create incentives for others to funnel portfolio capital fl ows through 
tax haven fi nancial affi liates and thereby sidestep local taxes and regulations. In 
public discussions, tax havens are commonly associated with banking secrecy and 
the ability of individuals and fi rms to hide their money abroad, though the evidence 
indicates that this may be largely a pattern of the past.
Table 6
Determinants of Economic Growth Rates, 1992–2006
Constant –726.6743 2,710.24
(962.9270) (1,900.5650)
Distance to haven – 0.0155853 – 0.011707
 (in thousand km) (0.0027) (0.0025)
ln Population 0.017275 – 0.0596946
(0.0035) (0.0476)
ln GDP – 0.0100822 0.0319412
 (in billion $) (0.0025) (0.0360)
(ln Population)2 0.001787
(0.0013)
(ln GDP)2 – 0.0004544
(0.0008)
Number of observations 76 76
R 2 0.8986 0.9243
Notes: The table reports coeffi cients from regressions in which the 
dependent variable is a country’s annual per capita real GDP growth rate 
between 1992 and 2006 in billions of 2006 U.S. dollars. Observations 
consist of 76 developing countries that the United Nations Human 
Development Index (⟨http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/⟩) classifi es 
as having “medium” or “low” human development. The coeffi cients are 
from weighted ordinary least squares regressions in which observations 
are weighted by 1992 GDP. “Distance” equals distances between 
geographic centers of each country, minus an adjustment for country 
sizes that treats each country as though perfectly round, and equals the 
square root of the ratio of country land area (reported by CIA, 2009) and 
π. “Distance to Haven” is measured in 1000s of kilometers. Population 
and GDP are 1992 values. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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If tax policy and fi nancial regulation in the rest of the world were ideal, then 
there would be little scope for the policies of tax havens to improve matters else-
where and greater reason to be concerned about their possible effect. In fact, few 
countries can lay claim to having perfectly designed taxes or regulations, so the 
relevant question is the effect of tax havens in the world in which we live. The 
evidence indicates that tax havens contribute to fi nancial market competition, 
encourage investment in high-tax countries, and may ultimately, in their little island 
ways, promote economic growth elsewhere in the world.
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